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Este estudio analiza si el comportamiento en un juego de bienes públicos 
secuencial con una única decisión se ve afectado por la información social 
que reciben los jugadores relativa al comportamiento medio de otros en su 
misma situación. El tipo de información social que consideramos no afecta 
directamente a los pagos de los jugadores y, por lo tanto, podemos separar 
la influencia social de otro tipo de efectos distributivos más convencionales. 
Encontramos evidencia clara de que las preferencias tienen en cuenta a los 
demás, que siguen un patrón de comportamiento en el que podemos 
identificar que cuanto más generoso es un sujeto, más recíproco es su 
comportamiento con respecto a las acciones de los otros. Sin embargo, hay 
pocos indicios de que la información social influya sobre sus acciones. 
Nuestros resultados sugieren que los modelos estáticos actuales de 
preferencias sociales no deberían tener en cuenta el efecto de la influencia 
social. 




We study whether people’s behavior in a one-shot sequential public goods 
type situation is affected by social information about average behavior by 
others in the same situation. The kind of social information we consider 
does not directly affect subjects’ payoffs and we are, therefore, able to 
separate pure social influence from more conventional distributional effects. 
We find clear evidence for other-regarding preferences; a specific patterns 
that we identify is that the more generous a subject, the more reciprocal his 
responses to others’ actions. However, there is very little indication of social 
influence in our data. The results suggest that current static models of 
social preferences need not take into account the effect of social influence. 
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 1.  Introduction. 
  Ledyard (1995), Bolton (1998) and Schram (1999) present extensive surveys which document 
that, in a variety of experimental situations, subjects deviate from own payoff maximizing behavior. 
Current experimental research in the area is directed at identifying more precisely the motivational 
forces behind observed behavior. The general aim of this type of work is to clarify which building 
blocks need to be used in the construction of satisfactory models of human motivation. One possibility 
is that people are motivated only by payoffs at the outcome to which decisions have led them. This 
includes the case where individuals are not only influenced by their own payoff, but also by the 
distribution of payoffs among others involved in the interaction. In contrast, a broader view of 
motivation would include people’s reactions to more general circumstances related to the situation in 
which choices take place.  
These other circumstances may be of different kinds. They may pertain directly to the 
characteristics of the decision-makers involved in the situation, e.g. to the amount of information they 
have or the degree of awareness under which they make their decisions. This type of issues have been 
studied by Blount (1995), Charness (1997) and Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996).  
One traditional way of introducing social circumstances in experimental games is the 
generation of artificial social distance through the creation of groups in the experiment. Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith (1994) experimentally verified that as social distance (isolation) increases, offers in 
the dictator game decrease. Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) and Frey and Bohnet (1997) 
showed similar results in different settings, although this kind of effects seems open to cultural centrA:
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differences
1. The anonymity level has proved to be another source of social effects in different 
experimental settings
2. 
The circumstances surrounding the act of choice may also correspond to features of the general 
environment that are not directly related to the decision maker. One of the possibly relevant types of 
non-outcome information is investigated in Bolton, Brandts and Katok (2000), Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Brandts and Solà (2002). In simple sequential 
two-player games these papers analyze whether choices from a certain opportunity set are influenced 
by the payoffs of other outcomes, which are not attainable at the point in the game at which those 
choices take place.  
  In this paper we study the influence on subjects’ choices of another type of non-outcome 
information: the behavior of others in the same situation. Our purpose is to find out whether, in a 
simple situation involving two players, an individual’s reaction to the other’s action is influenced by 
information about the behavior of a larger population in the same situation. We will refer to the 
information about average behavior as social information and we ask whether it is taken into account 
when people make their decisions, i.e. whether it leads to social influence. The social information we 
consider is a certain measure of average cooperativeness in a public goods situation. The notion that 
this kind of social information may affect people’s behavior is related to the ideas that social norm 
compliance or conformity are a significant force behind human motivation and decision making. 
Bernheim (1994) and Myles and Naylor (1990) contain theoretical models of this kind of factors.  
                                                           
1 Buchan, Croson and Johnson (2000) showed persistent differences between countries of the effect of social distance for 
both amounts sent and proportions returned in a trust game. 
2  Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1994) and Bolton and Zwick (1995) found larger offers without anonymity in 
experimetnal Ultimatum Games;Charness and Gneezy (2000) or Dufwenberg and Muren (2003) found similar results in 
Dictator Games and Andreoni and Petrie (2002) described a strikingly significant effect of the withdrawal of anonymity 
requirement in an experimental public goods game based on voluntary contributions. 
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A crucial feature of the kind of social information that we will deal with is that it does not 
directly affect subjects’ monetary payoffs. In other words, we are interested in studying the existence 
of a pure social influence effect. In this respect, our analysis of the effects of social information will 
differ from those carried out in other studies in which the dependence of subjects’ contributions on 
those of others is analyzed. Croson (1998) uses traditional linear public good experiments and shows 
that individuals’ contributions are affected by their beliefs about the contributions of others in his 
group. This evidence is at odds with linear altruism as the explanation of observed behavior, but it does 
not directly speak to the issue of a social influence effect. In this standard framework one can not 
separate the pure social influence of others’ contributions on a person’s behavior from the influence 
that results from the fact that others’ behavior affects the choice set of an individual and, hence, 
possibly his behavior. As shown below, our design is able to disentangle these two channels of 
influence.
3  
Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1999) investigate experimentally a related but different issue: 
the social influence of expressed intended actions. They study whether subjects’ contributions to a 
public good are affected by the result of an unbinding vote about desired contributions. It is, hence, a 
study of the reaction to expressed desired actions and not to effective actions. 
Cason and Mui (1998) study the impact of certain kinds of information on behavior in dictator 
games. In their experiments subjects made dictator allocations before and after receiving two different 
types of information. In one treatment they received information about the allocation made by one 
other subject, with which they were not paired in any of the dictator games. In a second treatment 
subjects were informed about the birthday of one other subject. The aim of their experiment was to 
explore the differential effects of relevant vs. irrelevant information. Duffy and Feltovich (1999) 
                                                           
3 The social influence effect we study is, hence, also different from interaction effects as studied theoretically by, for 
instance, Durlauf (2000) and Hoff (2000). 
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informed both proposers and responders on the actions and the payoffs of one randomly chosen pair in 
the last round of repeated games to find higher offers with than without social comparisons. 
This type of information about others’ behavior  is, in a general sense, social information of the 
type we are interested in: it is information  that does not directly affect payoffs. Following Manski 
(1995), we believe that the most relevant channel of social influence is the endogenous one, in which 
“the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the prevalence of that behavior in 
the group”
4. We find the endogenous social influence particularly interesting as it might generate a 
social multiplier effect and it is specially suited for the experimental methodology due to the several 
problems associated with its empirical estimation
5. We believe, however, that a measure of average 
cooperativeness is a more natural candidate, than the decision of just one other subject,  for exerting 
some kind of influence on individual behavior.
6 
To the best of our knowledge, only two previous experimental studies have dealt with this kind 
of endogenous social influence. Seinen and Schram (2002) found that subjects responded to 
endogenous individual information about former behavior of the partner on transactions with third 
parties. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2002) provided average information on proposer offers in a standard 
ultimatum game to find that offers were generally higher in games allowing for social comparisons. 
The effect of endogenous social information, however, has never been tested in a social dilemma game, 
in which the relevance of social interaction might play a determinant role due to the intrinsic social 
nature of the game involved. 
 
                                                           
4 Mankiw (1995) also admits the existence of contextual and correlated effects wherein the propensity of an individual to 
behave in some way varies with the distribution of the background characteristics in the group and the existence of similar 
institutional environments, respectively. 
5 Brock and Durlauf (2001) discuss the empirical estimation problems in a wide variety of structural social interactions 
models. 
6 See also Boyd and Richerson (1985) for an anthropological view on social influence 
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  2. Experimental design. 
  In our experiment each subject had to make two decisions which we will refer to as the first 
shot and the second shot; subjects were matched with different partners for the two decisions. Both 
decisions referred to a simple two-person public good game, which was presented to subjects in the 
form of the 5x5 payoff table shown in Figure 1. The payoff table was constructed from a public good 
payoff function. The possible contribution levels are 0, 100, 200, 300 and 400. In this presentation each 
subject sees himself as the row player.
7 From the experimenters’ point of view the first shot serves the 
purpose of establishing, in a way described below, social information which may act as a possible 
reference point. The second shot will then be used to analyze the possible influence of this social 
information. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
  In the first shot each individual had to simply choose one of the five possible actions. This 
decision was recorded on a control sheet which was then collected from each participant. After all the 
first shots had been made, subjects were informed about the average contribution corresponding to the 
first shot in the group; the group corresponded to the set of participants in a session. The instructions, 
that had been read at the beginning of the session, stated that after the first decisions would have been 
made, subjects would receive additional information, but it was not revealed what the information 
would be. The average of a group’s first shot is the social information the influence of which we want 
to study
8. 
                                                           
7  The payoffs in the table can be seen as derived from the payoff function Ui = .5xi + .83xj + (400 - xi). 
8 Minkin (2002) discusses advantages and limits of alternative measures across different theoretical models of interactions. 
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Then new control sheets were handed out and each subject took his second shot. The second 
shot was actually a conditional decision, which consisted in the choice of a separate contribution level 
for each of the possible first shots. Each subject knew that his second shot would be matched with 
another participant’s first shot. 
  After all the participants had made their second shot, the experiment was over. We then 
randomly matched every first decision with a set of second decisions. As noted above, subjects were 
not paired with each other twice, i.e. if subject i’s first shot was matched with subject j’s second shot 
then j’s first shot was not matched with i’s second shot. At the end of the experiment all subjects were 
privately paid according to the outcome of both decisions.
9  
  Our choice of design was guided by a number of considerations. First of all, we wanted to 
conduct our experiments in a one-shot environment. Observe that, since in our experimental set-up 
subjects are paired with different partners for the first and for the second shot, the game is one-shot in 
character. The main reason for this is that we want to place our study of social influence in the context 
of recent efforts to model interdependent preferences as exemplified by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and Fischbacher (1999), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) and 
Charness and Rabin (2002). All these models are static ones and, hence, the one-shot nature of our 
experiments. Dynamic features of social influence could be studied in future work. To obtain good 
information from a one-shot interaction one needs to use a simple design, which makes the acquisition 
of experience though repetition unnecessary. We believe that our set-up, including our matrix 
representation of the game, was easily understood by subjects
10.  
                                                           
9  For the first shot each subject received the payoff that corresponded to the combination of that first shot with that part of 
the matched subject’s conditional second shot decision that corresponded to the level of the first shot. For the second shot 
each subject’s payoff was determined in an analogous fashion. 
10 This opinion is also based on casual feedback provided by subjects at the end of each session.  
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  Second, we wanted to generate a rich set of  information. It is for this reason that we used the 
strategy elicitation procedure, first proposed by Selten (1967) as part of his more general strategy 
method. For each subject we obtained one first shot decision as well as five second shot decisions in 
reply to each of the five possible first shots. 
  Some recent evidence shows that the use of the strategy method does not significantly affect 
behavior in simple games like the one we are investigating here. In experiments with two-person 
sequential games, Brandts and Charness (2000a) study the effect of the strategy elicitation procedure 
on  responses to favorable and unfavorable actions. They find that the degree to which subjects deviate 
from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards as a response to others’ actions is not different 
between a “cold” treatment in which responses are made conditionally and a “hot” treatment in which 
responses follow observed actions. Directly related to the present study, Cason and Mui (1998) also 
fail to find an effect of this elicitation method on behavior. 
  A final feature of our design that we wish to highlight is that we needed to prevent subjects 
from trying to influence the average of first shots. For this reason, subjects were not told what type of 
information they would obtain after the first shots, although they did know that they would receive 
some kind of information. 
 
  3.  Experimental hypotheses and procedures. 
In a world inhabited exclusively by purely self-interested players (and this being common 
knowledge) behavior can be predicted unambiguously: every player will contribute zero both in his 
first shot and in all his second shots. With respect to his first decision, a player knows that if he makes 
a positive contribution, he has no reason to expect a favorable response by his partner. When a self-
interested player makes his second decision his own payoff maximizing choice is again to contribute 
nothing. In addition, since subjects were not aware of what kind of information they would get after the 
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first shot, a self-interested subject’s first shot could not be motivated by an attempt to influence second 
shot behavior via the average of first shots.  
  In the case in which not everybody is expected to maximize only his own payoff, behavior can 
be more varied. With respect to the first shot there are two reasons why a subject may purposefully 
make a positive contribution in the game we study. The first is that his preferences are not purely self-
regarding. The second reason is that it may be in the interest of a purely selfish player who expects his 
partner to be other-regarding to make a positive first shot contribution. In the second shot a purely self-
interested player will invariably contribute zero, while an other-regarding one may contribute some 
positive amount. 
  Players that are not only influenced by their own payoff may follow different types of 
motivations. As mentioned above, one type of other-regarding player may be guided exclusively by his 
own payoff  and by the payoff of his partner, both for the first and for the second shot. A player of this 
kind will make a first shot on the basis of his expectation of other players’ second shot responses to the 
different first shots. His second shot will then be guided directly by his preferences over combinations 
of payoffs between himself and his partner. Players like the one just portrayed would not be influenced 
by the information about average first shot behavior, that was available in our set-up. 
  However, subjects may also be influenced by the social information we provide them with. This 
is precisely the object of our study. In what follows we distinguish between two possible channels of 
influence of social information on subjects’ second shot. First, subjects may be influenced by their own 
deviation from the mean behavior of the experimental group they belong to. After observing the 
average of the first shot, subjects will have information about their first shot contribution in relation to 
the average contribution of the others in the group. They may use this relation to guide them in the 
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selection of their second shot decisions.
11 We can now formulate our first specific hypothesis; it posits 
that a player’s own distance from average behavior matters: 
 
 Hypothesis  1: (A player’s own social distance matters). Subjects’ second shot contributions are 
related to the distance between their first shot and the average of first choices. 
 
Given that in our design subjects make five second shot decisions there are several possible 
alternatives to hypothesis 1. One possibility is that none of the five second shots is influenced by the 
average first shot; in this case, the own social distance would have no social influence at all. However, 
different levels of partial social influence are also possible. We will return to this in our results section. 
Our second hypothesis is based on the notion that an individual may evaluate others’ behavior 
in relation to the general level of cooperativeness: how favorably a person behaves towards a partner 
may depend on what the partner’s behavior has been in relation to others in the first shot. When 
making their second shot decisions in response to a specific level of another subject’s first shot, 
subjects may be influenced by how different that particular first shot is from the average first shot; the 
other’s distance from average behavior matters. Our other’s distance hypothesis formulates this 
potential influence: 
 
 Hypothesis  2: (The other player’s social distance matters). Subjects’ second shot contributions, 
in response to another subject’s first shot contribution, are related to the distance between the level of 
the other’s first shot and the average of first shot choices. 
 
                                                           
11 Observe that our symmetric design makes it possible to obtain a benchmark measurement for every subject. A different 
simpler design in which some subjects took the first shot and some others took the second shot would not yield this 
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Due to the strategy method feature of our design, our analysis of hypothesis 2 can again be quite 
detailed. We are able to analyze how individuals respond to different levels of the first shot and 
whether those responses are affected by social information. 
We ran a total of 9 experimental sessions. Each session involved a group of 8 subjects. All the 
sessions were run at the University of Valencia. Subjects were recruited using posters as well as 
announcements in economics, business, law and industrial relations classes. The sessions took place in 
a large class room. After all subjects had entered the room  they were randomly assigned to seats that 
were separated from each other. At his seat each subject found an envelope with the instructions, the 
control sheets and a receipt. (A translation of the instructions and the control sheets can be found in 
appendix 2). The experimenter, the same in all sessions, then read the instructions aloud while subjects 
were reading along. The participants were allowed to ask questions during the reading of the 
instructions as well as during an additional period before the experiment began. Our impression is that 
subjects had no difficulty understanding the instructions and the procedures. 
 
 4.  Results. 
  Our statistical evaluation of the two hypotheses will be based on the results of a regression 
analysis shown below in table 5. However, we first present some descriptive statistics to give an 
overview of behavior in our experiment.
12 In table 2 one can directly compare the distribution of the 
first shots with the different second shot distributions. The first impression is that the second shot 
distributions all shift to the left with respect to the first shot distribution. This impression will be 
confirmed later. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
information. 
12 Appendix 3 contains the raw data. 
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[Table 2 around here] 
 
With respect to the first shot distribution, observe that the two extreme contribution levels are 
the most frequent ones. This first shot behavior was also observed by Brandts and Charness (2000b) in 
a different kind of linear gift-exchange game. Note also that the most frequent response is a zero 
contribution, but observe that for positive contributions the response increases with the level of the first 
shots. For the second shot distributions it can be seen that, except for FS=0, the most frequent non-zero 
response is the one that matches the corresponding FS. 
Table 3 shows average levels of the first shot as well as of the second shots for the different 
levels of first shots, separately for our nine groups, as well as the corresponding averages. ASS/FS=0 
denotes the average second shot for a first shot of 0, etc.. As is already visible in table 2 the average 
contribution in the first shot is higher than the average contribution for each of the second shot 
decisions. Ben-Ner and Putterman (2002) found a similar result in an experimental dictator game in 
which recipients in an initial game become dictators anonymously in a second game. The amount sent 
in the first DG was greater than the amount sent in the second even when second round dictators were 
paired with unknown partners. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
  The existence of a difference between first and second shots can be backed up with a statistical 
test; we can actually use individual data and compare the levels of the first shot separately with the five 
different decisions of the second shot. Using a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test we can 
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Observe now that, in table 3, the average second shots, shown in the last row, are increasing in 
the level of the first shot to which they respond. This observation can be supported by a Page test. The 
test allows us to reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis of identical means in favor of increasing 
means. Note, however, that at this point we have no information about whether this relation is 
influenced by the presence of social information. 
  Table 4 shows average second shot responses to the different possible first shots organized by 
what subjects gave in their first shots. The data in this table complement those shown in the bottom 
part of table 2 and give a preliminary impression about the effect of own distance. Note that for FS=0 
through FS=100 the ASS are not increasing. For the two highest values of FS they are increasing and, 
in addition, the differences between ASS/FS=0 and ASS/FS=400 is large. (FS=200 is somewhat of an 
intermediate case). Subjects who give low FS are not very sensitive to what others did in their FS, 
while subjects with high FS reward high FS by others quite strongly. The data in table 4 seem to hint 
that the more people give in the first shot, in relation to average giving, the more they also give to 
others in the set of second shots. With our regression analysis below we will be  able to verify whether 
this impression is justified. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Table 5 presents the results of a number of ordered probit regressions which relate directly to 
our main hypotheses. To give social distance a better chance we ran ordered probit regressions for the 
complete data-set, as well as for two different subsets of it. The top part of the table shows the 
regressions based on all 72 independent data points. The middle part and the bottom parts show the 
same regressions restricted to those 52 individuals who made at least one positive decision in either the 
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first or the second shot, and to those 31 subjects who made at least one positive decision only in the 
second shot.  
The regressions based on the decisions of all 72 participants reflect the overall impact of social 
distance. The data-subset with 52 participants excludes those who never gave anything and, therefore, 
could obviously not have been affected by social distance. It includes, however, those who only gave 
something positive in their first shot; this behavior can be the result of strategic behavior by purely 
self-interested players. The data-subset with N=31 includes only people who gave something in their 
second shots. This behavior can not be rationalized on the basis of purely self-interest; it is in this pool 
of participants where social distance could be expected to have a stronger effect. 
This set of regression results yields a rather rich picture of social influence in our data. With 
this specification we are able to jointly study hypotheses 1 and 2. Subjects’ second shot is the 
dependent variable. There are two independent variables, which correspond to our two hypotheses. The 
first is what we refer to as self distance, SD, the difference between a subject’s first shot and the 
average of the other subjects’ first shots (i.e. excluding the first shot of the subject in question). The 
second independent variable is what we call the other’s distance, OD, the difference between the 
other’s first shot under consideration and the average of first shots minus the specific first shot under 
consideration.
13 
Given the nature of our data we have five different estimations for each of the possible first 
shots to which the second shots respond. This is represented in the columns of table 5, where Ssi 
(fsj=x) denotes the second shot of an individual i in response to a first shot level of his partner j equal 
to x. The table shows, for each variable, the value and sign of the coefficient (which have been 
confirmed by the value of the marginal effect) and beneath it, in brackets, the absolute value of the t-
statistic; one, two and three stars reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The table also 
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shows the level of the log likelihood function, VLLF, the result of the Chi-square and the significance 
level of the regressions as a whole. 
The results shown in table 5 can be summarized as follows. First, we do find some evidence of  
the impact of social distance, but it is in general a rather weak force: most coefficients (and overall 
regression levels) are not significant. Second, the results suggest that subjects’ own social distance 
(SD, in the table) is a stronger force than the other’s social distance. The impact of the other’s social 
distance (OD) is actually negligible; in no case is the coefficient of the other’s distance significant at 
more than the 10% level. Third, own social distance has a local character, it matters more in relation to 
the extreme values of  the first shot.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
We now focus on the self distance coefficients for the case of N=31; the significant ones are the 
one for fsj=0 and the one for fsj=400. Note that the first of these is negative and the second is positive. 
This pattern is not consistent with a conformity effect of social distance, which would require the own 
distance coefficients to be all negative. Instead, one possible interpretation of the observed pattern of 
own distance coefficients is that, in their second shots, subjects respond in a selfish manner to fsj=0 
and in a generous way to fsj=400 and significantly more so, the more they themselves deviate upwards 
from the average first shot behavior in their group. Our study, hence, uncovers a certain pattern of 
behavior related to average behavior, but unrelated to social influence in the more intuitive sense.  
 
5. Summary and Results 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
13 Observe that both social distance measures can be both positive and negative. 
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We study whether subjects’ contributions in a public goods type situation is affected by social 
information, i.e. information about average contributions in a similar context. Our results show that, in 
general terms, social information is a rather weak force. We do find significant evidence that the more 
a subject contributes the more he will respond to low contributions with low contributions and to high 
ones with high ones. In a nutshell, our results suggest that the more generous a subject, the more 
reciprocal his responses to others’ actions will be. This effect finds social distance to be relevant in a 
way probably unrelated to the intuitive notion social influence; subjects are not reacting to their 
deviations from the mean. Rather, their behavior is such that it gives rise to a certain pattern that can be 
described in relation to mean behavior.  The consequences of our results are that present models of 
social preferences need not take into account social influence. 
A final thought about why social influence is not a relevant force in our data. Our experimental 
setting is static and, hence, subjects only experience a one-shot exposure to social information. In a 
more dynamic context, the repetitive communication of social information may give social influence a 
better chance. In terms of modeling this means that the current static models need not consider the 
impact of social influence. However, possible second-generation more dynamic models of social 
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APPENDIX 1: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: The payoffs 
  0  100 200 300 400 
0  You get 400 
The other 400 
You get 450 
The other 383
You get 500 
The other 367
You get 550 
The other 350 
You get 600 
The other 333
100  You get 383 
The other 450 
You get 433 
The other 433
You get 483 
The other 417
You get 533 
The other 400 
You get 583 
The other 383
200  You get 367 
The other 500 
You get 417 
The other 483
You get 467 
The other 467
You get 517 
The other 450 
You get 567 
The other 433
300  You get 350 
The other 550 
You get 400 
The other 533
You get 450 
The other 517
You get 500 
The other 500 
You get 550 
The other 483
400  You get 333 
The other 600 
You get 383 
The other 583
You get 433 
The other 567
You get 483 
The other 550 
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Table 2: Aggregate first shot frequencies and distributions of second shots 
conditional on first shots 
 
  Aggregate first shot frequencies 
  FS=0  FS=100 FS=200 FS=300 FS=400  Total 
29 7  9 12  15  72 
Distributions of second shots conditional on first shots of the other player 
 
 
Level of FS  SS=0  SS=100 SS=200 SS=300 SS=400  Total 
FS=0  59  6 1 1 5  72 
FS=100  55  10 1  3  3 72 
FS=200  50  7 7 5 3  72 
FS=300  47 7  4 13 1 72 
FS=400  52  4 0 3  13  72 
Total  263  34 13 25 25  360 
 
Table 3: Average levels of first shots and of conditional second shots 












Group 1  62.5 75  75  100  85.71  37.5  74.64 
Group 2  150 0  12.5  37.5  75  50  35 
Group 3  87.5 12.5  75  50  62.5  37.5  47.5 
Group 4  137.5 0  0  37.5  25  87.5  30 
Group 5  137.5  12.5  0 0 0  50  12.5 
Group 6  237.5 37.5  25  75  137.5  150  85 
Group 7  262.5  62.5  75 62.5 50 150 80 
Group 8  275 100  100  100  137.5  150  117.5 
Group 9  162.5 87.5  50  100  125  100  92.5 
Average  168.06  43.06  45.83 62.50 77.58 90.28  63.85 
 
Table 4: Average second shots conditional on first shots 
  ASS/FS=0 ASS/FS=100 ASS/FS=200 ASS/FS=300 ASS/FS=400 
Subjects FS=0  59 38  52  69  31 
Subjects 
FS=100 
14 86  57  71  29 
Subjects 
FS=200 
22 56  89  78  133 
Subjects 
FS=300 
58 42  108 108 175 
Subjects 
FS=400 
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Table 5: Ordered probit results. 
 






































VLLF  -47.6 -57.73 -73.45 -73.85 -57.80 
Chi-square 1.88  .33  .54  1.19  9.41 
Sig. Level  .39  .84  .76  .54  .9E-02*** 






































VLLF  -39.95  -49.83 -62.83 -61.79 -53.80 
Chi-square  7.66  3.14 4.01 4.33 1.63 
Sig. Level  .21E-01 **  .20  .13  .11  .44 






































VLLF  -33.80  -39.66 -47.80 -42.86 -34.03 
Chi-Square 3.65  .44  .58  .65  12.22 
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APPENDIX 2a: Instructions (translated from Spanish) 
 
  The aim of this experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in certain contexts. 
  You are going to make a number of decisions which will be directly linked to a monetary 
payoff. That is, by making decisions in the experiment you will earn money which will be paid to you 
at the end of the experiment. 
  The payment is confidential, given that nobody will know the payments received by the rest of 
the players. 
  If you have any doubts, you may questions about them at any time. Aside from these questions, 
any type of communication between you is prohibited en will lead to the exclusion from the 
experiment. 
Are there any questions ? 
  The experiment consists in making two decisions. Your two decisions will be paired 
anonymously, with a different person for each case, with those of the other participants in the 
experiment, in such a way that nobody will with whom he is paired with in each case. In each pairing, 
payoffs will be determined as follows. For each of the two decisions you have, like all other 
participants, 400 pesetas. The two decisions that you have to make consist in determining how you 
want to split the 400 pesetas between two possible uses. You can either keep the 400 pesetas or you 
can participate in a game with the player with which you are paired that yields the following payoffs: 
 
(REPRODUCE HERE THE PAYOFF TABLE FROM TABLE 1). 
 
Are there any questions ? 
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  Your first decision consists in choosing a quantity between 0 and 400 (in multiples of 100 for 
simplicity) on control sheet number 1. Your second decision will consist in choosing 5 different 
quantities between 0 and 400 (they can be the same or not): one for each possible decision of the other. 
Your first decision will be paired with the second decision of another participant and your second 
decision will be paired with the first decision of a another different participant. In addition, for making 
your second decision you will get some additional information which will be communicated to you 
before making that decision. 
  The payoffs from a pairing between a first decision and a second decision are determined as 
follows: of the 5 quantities that compose your second decision, the one that will be used will be the one 
that corresponds to the quantity that the player that you have been randomly paired with chose in his 
first decision 
  At the end of the experiment you will receive the payment corresponding to the pairing of your 
first decision and the one corresponding to your second decision. 
Are there any questions ? 
  On each control sheet you will have to write down your decision in the corresponding spaces as 
indicated. Your first decision will consist in writing a number between 0 and 400, in multiples of 100, 
in the corresponding space. Your second decision, which you will make after you will have received 
the additional information, will consist in filling out all the cells of a sheet like this with values 
between 0 and 400 (in multiples of 400) in dependence of the possible first decisions with which your 
second decision may be confronted. 
Are there any questions ? 
The sequence of the experiment is, therefore, the following. You have five minutes to analyze 
the payoff table and to ask any questions you may have about it. 
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Then you will write your first decision on control sheet number 1 (this decision will be 
randomly paired with a second decision of another player at the end of the experiment). Then we will 
collect the control sheets number 1. We will then give you some additional information and you will 
then write the five numbers of your second decision on control sheet number 2. Then your first 
decision will be paired with the second decision of another participant and your second decision with 
the first decision of another different participant. Then we will calculate the payoffs that correspond to 
you for the two pairings and you will be paid. 
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APPENDIX 2b: Control sheets 
 
Control Sheet No 1 
     
Player No:  ……….     
     
  First Choice:  ………    





Control Sheet No 2 
      
Player No:  ……….      
      
Second Choice:       
      
  The other player’s possible actions 
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Appendix 3: Raw Data 
Player  FS  AvgFS  SS-0  SS-100 SS-200 SS-300 SS-400 
1  200 62,5 100 100 100  0  0 
2  0  62,5  0 0 0 0 0 
3  0  62,5  0 0 0 0 0 
4  0  62,5  0 0 0 0 0 
5  300 62,5  0  0  400 300 300 
6  0  62,5 400 100 200 300  0 
7  0  62,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  0  62,5 100 400 400 300  0 
Avg Group 1  62,5   75 75  137,5  112,5  37,5 
1  200  150  0 0 0 0 0 
2  0  150  0 0 0 0 0 
3  100  150  0 0 0 0 0 
4  200  150  0 0 0 0 0 
5  400 150  0  100 200 300 400 
6  300  150 0  0 100  300 0 
7  0  150  0 0 0 0 0 
8  0  150  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 2  150   0  12,5  37,5  75  50 
1  0  87,5  0 0 0 0 0 
2  400  87,5  0 0 0 0 0 
3  100 87,5  0  100 100 100 100 
4  100 87,5  0  100 100 100 100 
5  0 87,5 0  0 100  200  100 
6  0  87,5  0 0 0 0 0 
7  0  87,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  100 87,5 100 400 100 100  0 
Avg Group 3  87,5  12,5  75 50  62,5  37,5 
1  300  137,5  0 0 0 0  400 
2  200  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
3  300  137,5 0  0  300 200 300 
4  200  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
5  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
6  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
7  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  100  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 4  137,5   0  0 37,5  25  87,5 
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Player  FS  AvgFS  SS-0  SS-100 SS-200 SS-300 SS-400 
1  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
2  300  137,5  100  0 0 0 0 
3  400  137,5  0 0 0 0  400 
4  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
5  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
6  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
7  0  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  400  137,5  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 5  137,5   12,5 0  0  0  50 
1  300  237,5  200 100 300 200 300 
2  400  237,5 0  100 200 300 400 
3  0  237,5  0 0 0 0 0 
4  400  237,5  0 0 0  300  100 
5  300  237,5  0 0 0 0 0 
6  100  237,5  0  0 100  200 0 
7  0  237,5  100 0  0 100  400 
8  400  237,5  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 6  237,5   37,5  25 75  137,5  150 
1  400  262,5  0 0 0 0 0 
2  0  262,5  0 0 0 0 0 
3  200  262,5  100 200 300 100 400 
4  300 262,5 400  300  0  0  400 
5  200  262,5  0 0 0 0 0 
6  200  262,5 0  100 200 300 400 
7  400  262,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  400  262,5  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 7  262,5    62,5 75 62,5 50 150 
1  400  275  0 0 0 0  400 
2  300 275  0  100 200 300 400 
3  400 275 400 400 400 400 400 
4  400  275  0 0 0 0 0 
5  0 275 0  0  0 300 0 
6  300  275  0 0 0 0 0 
7  0  275 400 300 200 100  0 
8  400  275  0 0 0 0 0 
Avg Group 8  275  100  100  100  137,5  150 
1  0 162,5  400 300 300 300 400 
2  100  162,5  0 0 0 0 0 
3  300  162,5  0 0 0 0 0 
4  0  162,5  300 0 300  300 0 
5  300  162,5  0 0 0 0 0 
6  200  162,5 0  100 200 300 400 
7  400  162,5  0 0 0 0 0 
8  0 162,5 0  0  0  100  0 
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Avg Group 9  162,5    87,5 50  100 125 100 
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